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prohibit all export
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license,

and to publish
and the

licenses granted

It

of exports permitted.

and destination

signed

to

the signatories

of arms and munitions except

government

annual reports concerning
quantities

territories in Africa

to prescribed

and the Near East.

been ratified or adhered

and

states,

by twenty-three

has now

to by at least nine states.

But the larger producing states have only signified
their willingness to ratify the Convention when it
is ratified by the United States, and in Washington
it has not yet beer> submitted to the Senate.
Although it is a distinct step forward, the Con
vention of St. Germain was not framed with a
view to preventing the evils of private manufac
ture.
When measures to the latter end are formu

November
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If

task?

all the producing states were to take part
the question might very well be
But some notable producers will
considered there.
not be represented — Czecho-Slovakia, for instance,
which has the important Skoda works. Moreover,
at Washington,

whose resources would easily admit
of their becoming producers, such as Rumania, will
not be represented.
It is difficult to see how the
some states

Conference could deal with the sub

Washington

ject adequately.

Yet the reduction
achieved

and limitation which may be

at Washington

For

will

need the full

of the world,

dence of the peoples

if

confi

they are to

lated, a single convention

the prevailing attitude to
In addition
trusts"
cannot
be ignored.
ward "war
to the problem of reducing and setting limits for
the future, assurance must be obtained that under

all shipments

no circumstances

embody

ment

might be drawn to forbid
of arms to prohibited areas, and to
measures which will protect the world

against

the possible

facture

and

the

of

evils

traffic

A

The next step is clear.

general

international

must study the whole problem of priv

conference
ate

private manu

both

in arms.

manufacture,

possibility of its abolition

the

and the possibility of its control, as well as the

last.

this reason

will the world" renew that arma
from which a holiday was so vainly
If competition is" allowed
sought before 1914.
to continue at all it must be brought out into the
light of day. Secrecy must cease to serve as seed
for suspicion of other peoples and their good faith.
race

The Washington Conference should recognize the
necessity of dealing with the possible evils of priv

problems

of the traffic in arms.
The second As
of the League of Nations has decided in
favor of holding such a conference to be convened

ate manufacture

sembly

go further, and plan

by the Council at the earliest

and

possible

date, and to

which all members of the League and all interested
states not members of the League are to be invited.
Can the Washington Conference undertake this

ference

and the traffic in arms.

It

should

a general

international con

at which both subjects

can be considered

an adequate

such a matter,

can be

convention

the country

on private enterprise

in other

In

can afford
O. Hudson.

countries

Manley

to take the lead.

framed.

which is least dependent
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nth,

the

of importance,

on Far Eastern questions

and

the question

Armistice

Conference

Day,

the limitation

Washington.

It

achievements

will

armaments

the' constructive record
of President Harding's ad-

constitute

How

much

and how completely

achieve,

foreshadowed
Secretary

in

will meet at

seems altogether likely that its

in international affairs

ministration.

of

November

the

the

Conference

may

it may fail, are both

program

tentative

Hughes has recently

submitted

which
to

the

The Hughes program outlines the problem before the Conference under three heads.
First in
the order of importance, although last on the tenthe

agenda,

Far

topics

serted

the sub-head

between

the sub-head land armament,

naval

armament

there is included

and
the

question of "rules for control of new agencies of
warfare."
Questions one and two, broadly conceived,

They

summarize
indicate

achievement.

its

the

purpose

tremendous

of

the

meeting,

opportunities

for

Question three, at once incongruous

alternative to failure.
The paramount problem before the Conference
of Washington, it will be generally agreed, is to
find some more satisfactory basis for mutual unwith reference to the Pacific and the
derstanding

and futile, suggests a dismal

powers.

tative

eluding

although first on the agenda, is
of the limitation of armaments, inboth land and naval forces.
Finally, in-

as

East.
the

is the question

This
mandated

includes,

of the Pacific and
of course, such

islands,

Siberia,

the

in-

tegrity of China, railways, concessions and monNext in the order
opolies, and the open door.

Far East.

If

this

can be

accomplished,

a

sub

stantial reduction in naval armament may be posit
Unless this much can be accomplished,
sible.
seems vain to hope for lighter armament burdens.

November

Now

let

without

conceive,

us

of extraordinary

Let

difficulty.

discover

that they should

by commercial

antipathies,

prophecy,

that

find this paramount problem

should

the delegates
one
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us suppose

it complicated by racial
and political rivalries

economic and social
springing from ineradicable
conditions, and by jealousies, suspicions, and ha
Let
treds which have been bred of past injustice.
us assume that in this situation they should finally
accept lip service to formulae as the most conven

If

ient palliative.
outcome
that

this,

substantial

anything

unhappily, should be the
it is quite unlikely

the first head,

under

can be accomplished

un

der the second. France and Italy may be trusted
to point out that the situation in Europe does not
warrant present reductions in their land forces,
while Japan and America, failing some real ad
justment of their more important rivalries, will
certainly emerge
more determined

with

from

the

chamber

conference

than ever to reinforce diplomacy

In

such a hypothetical impasse,
still
formulate "rules for con
may
trol of new agencies of warfare."
Whether regarded as an alternative to failure
under the main head or as an opportunity for sup
plementary achievement, the formulation of such
rules seems to promise, at best, a repetition of
power.

sea

the Conference

wasted

effort

of warfare"
turies,

and futile illusion.

"New

have provoked detestation

agencies

in all cen

and "rules for control" have been attempt

ed repeatedly
invention.

in the vain effort

The more common

rule has been a flat prohibition

to keep pace with

form of so called
enforced

by refus

quarter. In 1139, for example, a Catholic
council forbade the use of the cross-bow against
an art
Christians, pronouncing its employment
It is signifi
"death-dealing and hateful to God."
cant that little more than a century had elapsed,
however, before this anathema was construed to
ing

mean that one must not use the cross-bow

against

Christians unless one's cause were just. The cross
bow was soon replaced by the musket, and the
musket in its turn was universally stigmatized as
an unfair innovation contrary to the rules of lawful
warfare. For two or three centuries it was a com
mon practice to slay musketeers

without mercy

as a

forbidden weapons. Le bon
chevalier Bayard, when mortally wounded by an
arquebus ball, is said to have died thanking God
that he had never given quarter to a musketeer.
But the prohibition was futile. The introduction
of fire-arms was followed by the invention of an
The
extraordinary variety of new projectiles.
statement may be hazarded that there is hardly a
projectile known to military science which has not,
at one time or another,
had an anathema propenalty for employing

nounced against it.

31

Chivalric commanders

the use of hot shot or hollow shot against
emy in the eighteenth

century

in curious

forbade
the en
contrast

with the charges and recriminations of the dum-dum
bullet controversy in the twentieth.
On occasion,
indeed, such inhibitions have seemed to contribute
restraining influence, but generally the restraint
More often
apparent than real.
than otherwise, either the inhibition has soon be
come obsolete with the progress of invention, or it
has been overridden by the inexorable
exigencies
of war.
And it must always be so. Cannibalism was not
a

has been more

to use knives and forks
of an approved design.
Nor will war ever be
eliminated or even made appreciably
more toler
able by regulations
intended to control its instru

cured by teaching cannibals

For one thing, such regulations are
formulated in peace time. They are static. Yet in
time of peace science and invention are busily pre
paring for the next war. Only the next war can
adequately test the regulation, and the regulation
is likely to be shattered
in the test.
It is as cer
tain as any so called law in reference to the agen
cies of warfare can be that the employment
of
mentalities.

the submarine

merchant shipping in 19 15
Yet the submarine made its own
atrocious
code in the years that followed and it
is now taken for granted that it will be employed
against

was unlawful.

effectively in the next great maritime
Poison gas was a "barbaric means of
warfare prohibited by the laws of war."
It was
used by an unscrupulous
belligerent, retaliation
followed, and today the government laboratories
even more

struggle.

are discovering its possibilities as a super-horror
of the next conflict. The same is true of explosives
dropped from aircraft.
Effective "rules for con
trol of new agencies of warfare" simply cannot be
devised

today

because we do not know what the

of warfare" will

For an
be tomorrow.
other thing, as has been pointed out many times,
the very nature of war makes effective legal regula
tion of its agencies impossible.
War is abnormal,
the negation of law and order, the exaltation of
force. Detailed rules are certain to prove as futile
"agencies

provisions found in the mediaeval
in regard to jettison of cargo
in case of storm.
The ordinances distinguished
regular and irregular jettison with neat regulations
as

the curious

marine

as

ordinances

to the persons

to be consulted

and the goods

first to be thrown overboard.
Targa, an old
Genoese magistrate
of sixty years experience, is
said to have

remarked

that

he had known in all

that time of only four or five instances of regular

jettison and these instances were suspected of
fraud because the forms had been too well ob
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Detailed rules as to jettison were simply
worthless in the emergency of storm.
War is a

served.

storm.
does not mean that codes

called, have no place or function.

of war law, so
In the manuals

which governments issue to their armies and na
vies, such codes form a useful part of the equip
ment of the professional soldier. They are an aid
in preserving discipline

and a safeguard against
of the more brutal forms of retaliation.
They help to maintain a healthy tradition in the
service by conserving something of the old chival
ry.
By whatever emphasis they may place upon
considerations
of humanity, they contribute to save
the inherent brutalities of warfare from degener
There may even
ating into unmitigated savagery.
be advantages
in working for a degree of uni
some

formity among the manuals

as

If

the different countries.

they are issued in

undertaken,

however,

such a task ought to be referred to a conference
in which both first and

A

are

effort

only is it ill-fitted

upon

for

but it has vastly more important
The intended "rules for control
warfare" have no real relation
problems of the Pacific and the

of

lem

business to attend.

of new agencies of
to the tremendous

Far East, nor

than superficially relevant

they more

Not

such a task as this.

such work by its constitution,

Within

armaments.

the

are

to the prob

scope

of

these

major topics there is enough of opportunity as well
as responsibility.
There will be no real disappoint
should contribute nothing
ment if the Conference
to the code which Richard Hooker long ago de
scribed as "the laws of arms, which yet are better
known than kept."
Edwin D. Dickinson.

and

downgrade

the Japanese

upgrade,

to keep pace, the British veering
but winding around

eventually

speeding

up

off toward a lesser camp,
to the middle

of the broad

ers, that

in

found to be acceptable, formal
If the proposal
is
for such
conference will be issued.
vitations
manifest
that the question of limitation of armament
has
close relation to the Pacific and Far Eastern prob
has suggested that the powers
lems, and the President
these problems should undertake
especially interested
in

road.

as the Principal Allied and Associated Pow
Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, to
ascertain whether
would be agreeable to them to take
conference on this subject to be held in Wash
part
time to be mutually agreed upon."
ington at
known

tofore

It

camp-

who have
roll by have

some

it

as

a is

to the Disarmament

Washington,

in

with his "naval holiday" amendment to the navy appropria
tion bill, they have seen the American bandwagon rollicking

so because it was the first brief sign to catch the public's
its

intentions

antedated

was weak

The first

eye was the Borah

milestone

simple, sans Pacific problems,

resolution,
ments,

to catch the public

through

which Congress

The President
the Governments
representatives to
with the duty of

in signs.

or other accoutre

and

requested

to invite

of Great Britain and Japan to send
a conference, which shall be charged
promptly entering into an understand
ing or agreement by which the naval programs of each
of said governments, to wit, the United States, Great
Britain and Japan, shall be substantially
reduced an
nually during the next five years to such an extent and
upon such terms as may be agreed upon, which under
standing and agreement is to be reported
tive governments
for approval.

to the respec

That

the

brief

focussed
lowed

by

President,
question

reminder

attention
a

State

upon

from Congress
naval

Department

to

disarmament.
announcement

It

President
was
that

fol
"the

in view of the farreaching
of the
importance
of limitation of armament, has approached with

informal but definite

inquiries

the group

a

the discussion

relating

to

Obviously,

declared:

is authorized

been invited to take part
Far Eastern problems.

of powers

here-

that milestone
greatly enlarged upon the
holiday" idea. As
competent government
spokesman amplified
this formal statement,
"the admin
istration looked out over all horizons and the only inter
national situation which threatened war of importance
the next forty years was that in the Far East.
We resolv
ed,
possible, to remove the causes of friction between
the nations out there on the Pacific."
The reaction to
this step was magnetic.
As expressed
the press and
letters to the White House,
the public looked forward
at Washington of everything
to successful accomplishment
but only partially done by the Paris Peace
undertaken,
the League of Nations and the Hague Tribu
Conference,
nal.
This was one of the curves on the highway to Camp
which the President and the Secretary of
Disarmament,
They felt and
State look back upon as most dangerous.
still feel that the American nation expected too much from
Another dangerous curve was that round
the Conference.
mere

"naval

in

claims

by

administration

a

The

the Borah idea, but the administration

of
connection with this conference the consideration
all matters bearing upon their solution with
view to
common understanding
with respect to prin
reaching
ciples and policies
the Far East.
This has been com
municated to the powers concerned and China has also
in

does

in

if it deserves a

resolution,

to Camp Disarmament,

in

the milestones

a

among

if

That Borah "naval holiday"

eye.

no precious

is,

grand trunk highway

watched bandwagon after bandwagon
seen, is not without curves and grades.
In the five months
since Senator Borah first opened the road to disarmament

place

of publicists who have made the conduct of war
fare a special study. And when the work is done
there should be no illusions about its significance.
The Conference of Washington should spend

Baedeker to the Conference

meeting

both

also one which can com

mand the talents both of professional soldiers and

a
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